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Militarism—a mercurial, endlessly contested concept—is experiencing a renaissance of sorts 
in many corners of the social science community. In critical security studies, the concept’s 
purview has become increasingly limited by an abiding theoretical and analytical focus on 
various practices of securitisation. We argue that there is a need to clarify the logic and stakes 
of different forms of militarism. Critical security scholars have provided valuable insights into 
the conditions of ‘exceptionalist militarism.’ However, if we accept that militarism and the 
production of security are co-constitutive, then we have every reason to consider different 
manifestations of militarism, their historical trajectories and their inter-relationships. To that 
end, we draw on the work of historical sociologists and articulate three more ideal types of 
militarism: nation-state militarism, civil society militarism, and neoliberal militarism. We 
suggest this typology can more adequately capture key transformations of militarism in the 
modern period as well as inform further research on the militarism-security nexus.  
Introduction  
Scholarship on militarism is going through a lean period in the study of security. Critical 
security studies (CSS) is no exception: the ‘classic’ concerns of the literature on militarism as 
political violence—its causes, effects, phasing, evolution—are of little or no interest in a field 
increasingly devoted to ‘new wars,’ new technologies of war, ‘liberal war’ and notions of risk 
(Stavrianakis and Selby, 2012a). If it were not for a steady stream of scholarly production on 
the subject coming mainly from feminist theorists in select outlets, one would be tempted to 
conclude the study of militarism is now the province of sociologists and geographers. One 
exception is the work on securitisation—the critical scrutiny of the ways in which 
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constitutional or ‘normal’ politics are transformed, via speech acts, into ‘exceptions’. 
Conceived in the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of an agenda that sought to orient 
research away from the undue reduction of security to military affairs, securitisation theory 
eventually came to accept the centrality of military power to the emergence and development 
of security issues (Doty, 1998-9; Neumann, 1998). Today, it can be said that securitisation 
theory has inspired a whole body of research on what can be called ‘exceptionalist 
militarism’.  
In this article we attempt to situate this unsung contribution of securitisation studies in 
the established research tradition on militarism in historical sociology. Drawing on the 
contributions of Michael Mann and Martin Shaw, and specifically the idea that militarisms 
can be distinguished in terms of the ‘typical social forces’ and ‘prevailing social relations’ as 
their ‘core determinants,’ we situate ‘exceptionalist militarism’ in a typology that also 
includes ‘nation-state militarism,’ ‘civil society militarism’ and ‘neoliberal militarism’. An 
engagement with the broader concept and practices of militarism would advantage CSS by 
drawing attention to the social and historical context in which security is produced. If we 
accept that militarism and the production of security are co-constitutive, then we have every 
reason to consider different manifestations of militarism, their historical trajectories and their 
inter-relationships. We begin by situating the core literature on militarism in the in the context 
of recent debates from CSS. Drawing on the contributions of Mann and Shaw, we then 
develop a typology of militarisms that yields our four ideal types. After reflecting on the ways 
in which this typology could be useful to CSS, we conclude with some thoughts on the future 
study of militarism and its relation to security.  
 
Wherefore Militarism?   
While the study of security retains at its core the study of military power, much of what this 
entails is taken for granted and subjected to a real neglect due to established norms 
concerning the scope and uses of military power. This applies broadly to both ‘realist’ and 
‘liberal’ investigations of military power, as typified in the U.S. context by normative 
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invocations around the use of force or reoccurring policy debates concerning the ‘correct’ 
levels of military spending (e.g., Foreign Affairs, 2016, c.f. Mabee and Vucetic, 2017). For 
over two decades, CSS scholars have shown the limits of such perspectives: established 
categories of analysis often obfuscate as much as they illuminate, to say nothing of failing to 
match new realities. Looking at the substantive contents of a leading CSS textbook (Peoples 
and Vaughan-Williams, 2014), we see that the expansion of the study of security now 
fruitfully includes: environmental security, health, homeland security and the ‘war against 
terror’, human security and development, migration and border security, and technology and 
warfare in the information age. What we do not see, however, is a sustained attention to the 
concept of militarism. Similarly, the two leading CSS journals – International Political 
Sociology and Security Dialogue – have published very few pieces where the main focus is on 
militarism (or militarisation).1 Although overlaps exist between militarism on the one hand 
and areas such as ecology and policing on the other, this literature has not been fully engaged 
with the military as an institution, or in terms of the ideology of militarism (Stavrianakis and 
Selby, 2012a: 10). Overall, the theoretical and analytical focus of CSS has tended to be on the 
ways in which ‘violence’ is brought into areas beyond that of direct interest to the military 
rather than on the continued relevance of the military as key institution of power. This indeed 
is the necessary context for understanding the recent creation of separate journal that deals 
directly with issues to do with the military – Critical Military Studies (there is also an 
emergent field of Critical War Studies with overlapping themes, that relies on a similar 
critique of CSS: see Barkawi, 2011). We think the reasons behind this systematic side-lining 
of militarism in CSS lie in the genealogy of the field, and specifically the attempt of some of 
its progenitors to move the study of security away from the study of military affairs (Buzan & 
Wæver, 1997: 242). This has been accomplished: CSS contributions to the knowledge of 
other ‘sectors’ of security, of sovereign authority, of politics and the political are all 
                                                
1 For International Political Sociology, from 2007-2017, there were only four articles with some variation on 
‘militarism’ or ‘militarization’ in the title and five in the abstract (adding up to six overall). In Security Dialogue, 
between 2002-2017, there were no articles with ‘militarism’ in the title, one with ‘militarization’; and two with 
‘militarism’ in the abstract; a search of ‘militarism’, ‘militarized’ and ‘militarization’ as a ‘topic’ yielded 10 
results. Details available upon request.  
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significant and influential (Wæver, 2011).  However, it is now time to bring military affairs 
back in, and specifically militarism. 
It is important to recognize the concept’s essential ambiguities (Berghahn, 1984). 
Semantically, the acquisition of the potential for force or the relative weight and importance 
of the state’s military in relation to its society (see the Global Militarization Index by the 
Bonn International Center for Conversion, for example) is sometimes conflated with the 
disposition to use force (‘militarism’), which in turn confuses debates over hypothesised 
cause-effect relationships between the two processes. More fundamentally, conceptual 
ambiguities are sociological and philosophical. In the classic work by John Gillis (1989), for 
example, the militarism-militarisation distinction is linked to social stratification and 
modernisation, with the analysis apprehending the difference between a class approach to 
militarism (‘militarism’ thus describing the domination of society by an atavistic social class) 
and one that saw militarism as a form of economic life (‘militarisation’ thus depicting forms 
of industrialisation with the military at their core). Begin with an alternative social theory, as 
Catherine Lutz (2002) does, and militarisation becomes the discursive production of symbolic 
and representational militarised realities. This is also why different scholars interpret the 
‘same’ militarised realities so differently: the nature of the military/police distinction (Weiss, 
2011; Neocleous, 2014) or the rise of the ‘virtual’/‘virtuous war’ (Ignatieff, 2000; Der Derian, 
2001), for example.  
In historical sociology, and especially the neo-Weberian historical sociology of the 1970s 
and 1980s, the question of conceptualisation revolves around two basic questions: how 
fundamental is militarism to political and social life? (i.e. is it a property of all states and 
societies?); and how does the historicity of the concept of militarism frame our explanations 
of it? (Shaw 2012). Mann, in the context of his broader studies of social power, has dealt with 
these core issues through a series of macro-sociological and typological frameworks that 
looked at the phasing and co-evolution of militarism on the one hand and different types of 
states, forms of popular sovereignty, and racial ideologies on the other (Mann, 1988, 1996; 
c.f. 1993). His main argument is that understanding modern society requires sustained 
attention to militarism, which he defines as ‘a set of attitudes and social practises which 
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regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity’ (1987: 166; 
also see Eastwood, this issue). 
Mann’s expansive conception of militarism can be productive for CSS because it links 
both disposition and social purpose. Preparing for war (including the institutionalisation of 
militaries, and the networks of logistics and production required to support them) will exist 
wherever military power is seen as useful, both internally (e.g. for pacifying populations, 
economic growth) and externally (e.g. for achieving expansive goals). In this way, militarism 
research orients itself to the general questions of social and political order rather than the 
more specific questions such as those around military capitalisation and civilian control. This 
is in line with the vision of CSS for two reasons. First, it alerts us to the agents operating 
outside, or parallel to, state structures, which, as Mann argues, are responsible for some of the 
most ferocious manifestations of militarism in history. Second, it highlights military power as 
that which circulates, and is embodied, beyond the state rather than something that is or is not 
controlled by assorted state actors, as in liberal and institutionalist theories (e.g. Caverley 
2014).  
In more recent work, Mann has moved to define militarism in terms of ideological power, 
specifically that related to patriarchy and masculinity (for example: 2012, 134; c.f. Mann, 
1986a). This offers yet another useful connection with CSS, this time via the rich feminist and 
gender literature on militarism (see, inter alia, Dyvik and Greenwood, 2016; Sjoberg and Via, 
2010; Wibben, this issue). While focusing more on the micro level (and generally more 
culturally orientated in its conceptualisation and operationalisation of militarism), this work 
provides an important foundation for macro work. Furthermore, to the extent that sociologists 
are interested in explaining properties and actions of individual agents, their focus is 
undeniably on collective phenomena that are not reducible to the actions, beliefs or desires of 
any single member of a given society. However, a good sociological account always looks at 
the relations, processes and mechanisms by which social (or sociocultural) structures 
constrain individual action and interaction as well as for the relations, processes and 
mechanisms by which individual action and interaction produces social structures (see 
Alexander and Gieson, 1987; and Layder, 1994). This is why we think our typology could 
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inform both macro-historical accounts and the accounts of the relational structures in which 
individuals’ actions occur. In other words, we need to move back and forth between the micro 
and macro to get a fuller picture of militarism, charting out connections between micro-
contexts, the ways in which guiding ideas of militarism travel, and how they are reinterpreted 
and applied in other contexts. We also take this approach to be essential to the study of global 
militarism that moves away from ‘methodological nationalism’ and towards appreciation of  
‘global connections’ (Stavrianakis and Selby, 2012a: 15). 
Where Mann outlines a broader macro-understanding of militarism, Shaw provides the 
basis for our typology, seeing in militarism two main determinants: ‘the typical social forces 
mobilised in military power’ and ‘the social relations of military power (2012: 4-5). The 
‘typical social forces’ refer to economic, political, cultural resources mobilised by social 
constituencies—that is, by complex configurations of different actors, institutions, and 
practices situated at once in a particular society and the broader social and historical context. 
As Shaw describes it, ‘we are talking about the role of socialised warfare in a militarised 
economy and society’ (Shaw, 1988: 24). As such, war and society need to be seen as 
inseparable, with militarism as a kind of ligature between the two. Shaw’s second main 
determinant of militarism, ‘the social relations of military power,’ refers to ‘the always 
potentially antagonistic relation between armed actors (combatants) and civilians (non-
combatants)’ (2012: 5). Unless it is perfectly pacifist and non-violent or, conversely, it is 
organised such that warfare and preparation for warfare are an end in itself (‘most states have 
militaries, but in Prussia the military has a state,’ as one popular caricature holds), a society is 
likely to struggle to establish a ‘workable’ relationship with organised violence. Interest in the 
social relations of military power is shared by scholars of civil-military relations, whether 
those working on the venerable problems of professionalism and control mentioned earlier or 
on the newer developments such as the civilianisation of military organisations, the 
marginalisation of the military functions of the state (especially in terms of how civil-military 
relations are a form of power; see e.g. Basham, 2016), or how civil-military relations intersect 
with gender, race, class, sexuality and post-coloniality (Baker, et al, 2016).  
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To the extent that CSS deals with militarism, the field’s focus is on analysing ideas, 
discourses, policies, institutions and processes within specific sites or nationally bounded 
networks. We believe that the study of security within CSS can benefit from seeing militarism 
as a global and transnational phenomenon, and specifically from the historical sociological 
perspectives à la Mann and Shaw. To that end, we develop a typology of the ‘macro-
dynamics’ of militarism.  
Towards a Typology  
Weberian ideal types—abstractions distilled from concrete phenomena—serve to 
categorise, compare and contrast complex social systems, and in some cases map out the 
historical trajectory of social transformation. The typology developed below is not intended to 
be transhistorical. It is meant to convey present categories as a means to bring some order to a 
messier reality, in a given time period. In doing so, the typology brings what Mann (1986b: 4) 
refers to as ‘proximate methodology’, while acknowledging a ‘skeptical empiricism’ (Mann, 
1986b: 4) towards the boundaries that typologies create. The typology recognises the 
historical contingencies and context inherent in the concept of militarism, though revolving 
around a core focus on the purposeful use of organised violence. Our starting point is a 
recognition that ‘social forces mobilised in military power’ are engendered by general 
technological revolutions, reigning rationalities and organisational logics, the mode of 
capitalist development and other factors. They also intersect with religion, gender, race, 
ethnicity, nationhood and other axes of identification that construct, reproduce and restructure 
social reality and human experience. Building on previous typological studies of militarism, 
we suggest that a core element of said social forces of socio-economic liberalisation (Joana 
and Mérand, 2014). This is of course a convenient simplification. The ‘social relations of 
military power,’ Shaw’s second core determinant of militarism, is seen in the myriad forms of 
conflict and stratification of militaries (and other violent organisations) as organisational 
actors within and across societies. This can be best seen in the forms of stratification between 
‘soldiers’ and ‘civilians’, as in the notions of ‘separation’ and ‘fusion’ (or ‘blurring’), terms 
derived the classic debates on civil-military relations in the liberal-institutional tradition.  
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Separation typically means that armed forces are ‘professional’—that is, apolitical and 
subordinate to civilian authority (e.g., Huntington, 1957, 8-18), but we expand this out to look 
at ways in which militaries are functionally separate from the civilian population, and 
potentially autonomous actors with regard to political power. Fusion refers to the collapse of 
the conventional or formal civil/military distinction (also see Grassiani, this issue).  
Much like the binaries we use to think about security in CSS (inside/outside, 
public/private, military/policy, war/peace, security/insecurity, militarization/de-militarization, 
war/law enforcement), the civil/military binary is problematic. For one, formally dividing the 
non-uniformed civilians in government from the uniformed military has a tendency to mask 
rather than elucidate the ways in which militarism influences society. As much of the 
literature on civil-military relations is about order, not surprisingly we could take much of this 
further in terms of the idea of ‘civil’ rule being disordered and ‘military’ rule being ordered. 
Our approach conceives the military as an institution (or even organisation, as Mann does), 
contrasting ideal-typically with the political-organisational power of the state. This allows for 
a distinction in purpose and process, while also revealing different entwinings of both formal 
and informal networks of power implicated in the categories ‘civil’ and ‘military.’ The 
constitutional guarantee of civilian autonomy, for example, cannot prevent military values, 
beliefs, organisational culture, language, and technology from shaping different areas of the 
civilian life (e.g., Enloe, 2000; c.f. Woodward, 2016: esp. 53). ‘Separation’ therefore implies 
an ideal type where the institutions are functionally separate, and ‘fusion’ where the 
political/state cannot be separated from the military/organised violence. 
Different configurations and interactions of, respectively, the ‘social forces’ and 
‘prevailing social relations’ yield different militarisms. CSS, on its part, has dealt with what 
can be called ‘exceptionalist’ militarism. However, militarism can be parsed into three more 
ideal types that are of relevance to the field. We label these, provisionally, ‘nation-statist,’ 
‘civil society’, ‘neoliberal’.  
 
Exceptionalist militarism relates to the concept of the exception, as articulated in the 
thought of the one-time Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt (2005) [1934]) and more recently by theorists 
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of the political Left, such as, above all, Giorgio Agamben (2005). Much of this thought 
revolves the political and legal constitution of sovereignty through the suspension of regular 
legislative and judicial rules and procedures, via unified civil society support, for the purposes 
of dealing with enemies and security threats (Huysmans, 2006). This is the core of Schmitt’s 
claim that the ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (2005: 5). This framework is 
relevant for the conceptualisation of militarism: if any political order can suspended through 
state-of-emergency decisions undertaken in defence of the state against the enemy, then it 
follows the separation between the armed forces and the state is always contingent and 
indeterminate. Similarly, if the ultimate test of sovereignty is war, then militarism may be 
necessary for the political to exist (Schmitt, 2007 [1932]: 34-35).     
The re-articulation of state sovereignty through the state of exception has received much 
attention by CSS scholars interested in power grabs, loss of individual freedom, and 
exclusionary and dehumanising tendencies in the context of the zones of free movement (e.g., 
Bigo, 2000) and the global modalities of ‘liberal warfare’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009), including 
various exceptional militarised practices associated with the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’—
detention camps, extraordinary rendition and aerial targeted killings (Grayson, 2016). 
Certainly, alternative Schmittian readings of militarism are possible—its role in the 
constitution of the nomos, Schmitt’s term for the distribution of spheres of influence in 
international politics, that is, spatially distributed external authority (Odysseos and Petito, eds. 
2007, esp. Part IV), for example. Yet there are good reasons why CSS has focused on liberal 
democratic exceptionalism. If, for instance, it can be shown that contemporary U.S. 
constitutional and practical checks and balances cannot impede the sovereign’s decision to 
mobilise military power in response to urgent, extraordinary and existential threats, then 
exceptional militarism is likely to be a side-product of securitisation processes everywhere. It 
is the same for the social forces implicated in the rise of the market society: if thoroughly 
capitalist advanced liberal democracies states engage in exceptionalist militaristic practices, 
then all polities can, too. What is more, following in part the interpretations of Schmitt by 
Claudia Aradau (2007) and Renato Cristi (1998), it may well be that capitalist development is 
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co-constitutive with exceptionalism and the juridical, political and military transformations it 
effectuates.  
 
Nation-statist militarism is the default (‘normal’) setting for militarism in international 
and global life.  Following Mann, this manifestation of militarism is characterised by some 
form of civilian control over the armed forces and a state-led economic and social 
mobilisation of ‘destructive’ forces. An ideal-typical example is modern Prussia: in claiming 
legitimate authority, its leaders prioritised territorial defence; planned, built and consumed 
from its own arsenals; and engaged in military recruitment practices that reflected and 
reinforced the prevailing social structures of the nation (whether professionalised or 
conscripted) —hence an effort to turn male Junker landowners into the officers of the army, 
rather than male serfs, shopkeepers, Polish nobles or some other group.2  
Nation-statist militarism is sometimes dubbed ‘Westphalian militarism’ (Joana and 
Mérand, 2014) and even ‘Keynesian militarism’—a version of the idea that governments can 
and should pursue counter-cyclical policies such as, in this case, the use of military spending 
to boost employment and economic activity when the economy is sagging.  Nation-statist 
militarism also subsumes Mann’s (1996) categories of ‘authoritarian militarism’ and ‘liberal 
militarism’ as these are fundamentally statist; indeed, Mann used them to demonstrate 
historical shifts in militarism involving the absolutist European polities and their twentieth 
century authoritarian descendants (e.g. Germany, Russia) on the one hand and the polities 
deriving from constitutional regimes (e.g. Britain, France) on the other.3 Nation-statist further 
subsumes the militarisms of the post-1945 nuclear age, which include, in Mann’s 
terminology, sub-types like ‘deterrence-science militarism’ (‘techno-scientific militarism’) 
and ‘spectator sport militarism.’ All of these labels capture essential aspects of contemporary 
militarism involving the state and nation. While often seen as a militarism of the past, nation-
                                                
2 The Prussian social militarisation thesis has been much criticised, revised and re-vised since receiving 
theoretical attention in the middle years of the twentieth century by Otto Büsch and others. For more on this and 
nearby examples, see Frevert (2004).   
3 Mann’s typologies of militarism can be seen as Eurocentric (Shaw, 1991). For a more global perspective in the 
same tradition, see Abernethy (2002).  
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statist it is one that consistently reasserts itself, and needs to be accounted for (Mabee and 
Vucetic, 2017). 
 
The third type of militarism still derives from a pronounced statism, but thrives on 
deliberately blurred lines between soldiers and civilians. The classic manifestation is what 
Mann calls civil society militarism—the use of organised military violence in pursuit of social 
goals that is ‘state-supported, but not state-led’ (1996: 235). This conceptualisation is 
especially helpful in thinking about Europe’s liberal regimes from the perspectives of their 
colonial empires in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australasia (Mann, 1996: 235, 237). 
Indeed, in assessing the sordid history of civil society militarism, Mann deliberately draws 
parallels with nation-statist militarism, including the ‘militarised socialism’ of the Soviet 
Union and the Nazi German ‘nation-racist’ militarism: ‘So viewed, in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, only a handful of European countries—the Nordics (minus Finland), 
Switzerland, and Luxembourg—can be meaningfully described as liberal pacifist’ (Ibid.: 
1996: 233). 
Mann discusses civil society militarism as a sub-set of liberal militarism. What we wish to 
emphasize are organizational similarities between violence inherent to modern European (and 
Japanese) colonial imperialism on the one hand and para-military and para-legal forms of sub-
state violence characteristic of the rise of fascism in the interwar period on the other. The rise 
of paramilitary organizations in Weimar Germany is an example (Berghahn, 2006). More 
importantly, although not as pervasive and powerful as in the era of colonial empires, military 
power continues to be mobilised by civilian actors even today. Many criminal, terrorist and 
insurgent groups belong to the ‘state-supported, but not state-led’ rubric, but their activities 
constitute only one dimension of civil society militarism. The Mexico-United States border 
control ecology has over the past decade included a number of the so-called vigilante groups, 
such as the now-defunct Minuteman Civil Defence Corps or the American Border Patrol, 
whose leaders are now keen to share their expertise with the Trump administration. There, 
militarism is configured in the deployment of military veterans, military hardware and tactics 
(drones and small planes engaged in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
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operations), and military culture (camouflage outfits, command structure) to ‘monitor the 
border’ and, in some cases, interdict and detain border-crossing immigrants as well.4   
The ongoing ‘refugee crisis’ (a.k.a. the human crisis or crisis of being a refugee) in 
Europe has witnessed similar developments, at varying scales, everywhere from Spanish 
North Africa to Bulgaria to Finland. Other contemporary examples include armed civilian 
groups that participate in activities described as anti-crime (e.g., extra-judicial killings 
occurring as part of Philippine leader Rodrigo Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’ today or by Brazil’s 
justiceiros in the 1990s), counterterrorism (e.g., against Boko Haram in the Sahel), 
counterinsurgency operations (e.g., eastern Ukraine) and cultural policing (e.g., gau rakshaks, 
or cow protectors, in India). Indeed, what is remarkable here is not the decline of armed 
civilian groups replacing or shadowing state-run border control, police and military forces, 
but their stickiness in modern life (Pratten and Sen, 2007). How these groups define threats to 
individual or collective security, what they do to check or remove those threats, how they 
manage to co-exist with state institutions, and what ramifications all of this has for different 
security agendas are questions yet to be systematically examined in CSS.  
 
Neoliberal militarism refers to the configuration of social forces and social relations in 
which military mobilisation is achieved at once through the framework of socio-economic 
liberalisation and through the formal division between (professional) soldiers and civilians. Its 
conceptual predecessor, liberal militarism, was originally developed to identify and explain 
the uniqueness of the British experience. According to David Edgerton (1991), Britain has 
long been characterised by an elite-mass consensus on the need to shift the costs of war onto 
professional soldiers and foreigners and a corollary preference for force structures geared to 
conventional high technology war-fighting (‘capital-intensive’) as opposed to that rigged for 
labour-intensive tasks such as long-term occupation. This idea was further developed by 
Mann and Shaw, who used it to identify, respectively, the evolution of militaristic activities of 
                                                
4 For the latest updates on the latter, see http://americanborderpatrol.com/ (Last accessed on 21 January 2017). 
For a rare study of this phenomenon in CSS, albeit from the perspective of what we call exceptionalist 
militarism, see Doty (2007).  
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the West European liberal democracies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Mann, 
1988; 1996) and in the twenty first century (Shaw, 1991, 2005, 2012).   
In their recent typology of liberal militarism, which focuses on contemporary Western 
Europe, Jean Joana and Frédéric Mérand (2014) make a convincing case that the post-1970s 
and 1980s economic liberalisation has considerably transformed the enactment of militaristic 
activities (also see Basham, this issue). The expansion of the ideas, institutions and practices 
of neoliberal capitalism certainly transformed the social forces mobilised in military power, 
first in the Euro-Atlantic area, and then globally. However, the ‘market society’ conditions the 
mobilisation of military power from the way it causes new fractures in society, as Karl 
Polanyi argued in The Great Transformation, and the development of specific modes of 
governance that emerge from liberalism and neoliberalism, as examined by Michel Foucault 
in The Birth of Biopolitics. The relevant developments are thus not simply the marketisation 
of defence procurement and of personnel management and the decline of the military draft, 
but also include the rise of private military actors such as neo-mercenary and security 
companies (staffed by military veterans using high-tech military gear—see Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2011 and Grassiani, this issue), the privatisation and spread of military logistics 
(and its overlaps with corporate logistics—see Cowen, 2014), the proliferation of new 
military technologies (as in ‘smart’ border control—see Bigo, 2014), and the growing 
openness and competition in the international arms market (e.g. Halper, 2014). The mechanics 
of late capitalism go hand-in-hand with (neo)liberal imagination of freedom and fluidity.   
The most brittle boundary among our ideal types is between nation-statist militarism and 
neoliberal militarism. Socio-economic liberalisation does not necessarily lead to the 
weakening of the nation state. Although some neoliberal developments are clearly reflected 
in, and reinforced by, an increasing geographic dispersion of production and consumption of 
military goods and services as well as in the growth of truly multinational military 
development and production, they do not impact all states and societies, and certainly not in 
uniform ways. The military draft, for example, remains in place in much of the world outside 
Europe and while no European state has abolished it by constitutional fiat, some, like Sweden, 
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are now re-introducing it. All that said, the neoliberal imagination has and is likely to 
continue to impact the beliefs, values and practices of many military institutions.  
 
What Next? 
Typologies help theorists map out different aspects of the phenomena they study and 
identify areas of relative under-theorisation. The purpose of this typology has been to show 
that CSS lacks, but needs to have, a better appreciation of militarism and its different forms.  
The chief reason is the importance of context. If historical sociologists are right, the 
production of security cannot be separated from the sources of social power and therefore 
from the attitudes and practices involving warfare. The typical social forces and the prevailing 
social relations that give rise to diverse forms of militarism in different historical, social and 
political contexts are also likely to give rise to different meanings of security (c.f. 
Abrahamsen, this issue).  As many critics have pointed out in the case of securitisation 
research, the nation-statist, liberal, and Western priors that dominate this scholarship do not 
have universal purchase.5  
Are the borders created by such a typology too neat in terms of caging what cannot be 
caged? Only if the alternative is methodological uncertainty. The point of the typology is not 
to deem anything that falls in between categories as marginal or irrelevant, but mainly to 
demonstrate diversity within the broad category of militarism. We indeed think of it as a 
useful guide to moving away from militarism as a mainly statist concept, by introducing a 
range of other forms of militarism and a means to looking at them globally. The typology is 
also meant as a means to furthering research in CSS, namely by illustrating the ways in which 
different forms of modern militarism fit within a broader field of critical security. Focusing 
only on one form of militarism, as in securitisation research, risks a conceptually 
impoverished portrayal of the social and political world and quite possibly a depoliticised 
depiction of violence as well (see Eastwood, this issue).  
                                                
5 This especially applies to the first generation securitisation studies. For discussions, see, inter alia, Williams 
(1998), Doty (1998-9), Wilkinson (2007), Barkawi (2011), and the contributions to the 2011 Security Dialogue 
special issue on ‘The Politics of Securitization Theory’, especially Wæver (2011).  
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Another distinct benefit in thinking militarism typologically is that it helps us trace its 
main historical lineages. A substantial historical engagement is necessary for better 
understanding the contemporary dynamics of military power, not only seeing the changes 
taking place today, but their specific historical trajectories. We would argue that if there is 
historical movement in our typology, it is clearly at present pushed by socio-economic 
liberalisation, rather than a shift in the boundaries between soldiers and civilians. What to 
make of this movement is another matter. We might want to clearly link this shift up to 
developments in global capitalism—surely crucial—but linking the trajectories of militarism 
too straightforwardly to political economic tendencies would betray some core insights of the 
historical sociological literature that we draw on: seeing militarism and military power as 
contingently related to other forms of power. This is why it is so crucial not lose sight of the 
other modes of militarism, and also see how readily they fit into the prevailing norms or 
ideologies concerning the ‘usefulness’ of military power. Attention to such developments can 
go a long way in helping CSS scholars meet the aforementioned demand for better contextual 
awareness.  
Typologies can additionally help identify the conditions under which different aspects of 
the phenomena relate each other. A case in point is the relationship between civil society 
militarism and the other three types. One of the core goals of CSS has always been to recast 
the study of security away from dominant—usually translating as state- and military-centric—
discourses, institutions, and practices. Yet, if civil society militarism is characterised by state 
support, then the theoretical and analytical emphasis should be on the means through which 
that state support materialises—and these can entail normal, exceptional, and neoliberal 
components, to various degrees and in various combinations. The bigger picture of these 
arguments is the situating of militarism in either the interstices of state power, or, in terms of 
the reconfiguration of political power. Going back to Hardt and Negri (2005), militarism as a 
dimension of power is increasingly biopolitical, meaning engendering the management of 
populations in the Foucauldian sense, and global in reach (‘Empire’). To more fully 
understand these reconfigurations, CSS would therefore have to not only think more broadly 
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about exceptionalist militarism, but also about how exceptionalist militarism is co-determined 
by other forms of militarism. 
   
Conclusions 
The stakes of understanding the diverse modalities of militarism are as high as ever. As 
should be clear from the typology above, we see present day CSS as mainly influenced by 
‘exceptionalist militarism’. In some ways this is not entirely surprising due to Western 
scholars’ abiding interest in the US-led ‘war on terror.’ However, despite any insights that 
this quite extensive literature has brought, the inclusion of other modalities of militarism is 
crucial for both seeing more diversity in practice in contemporary global politics, but also for 
understanding the historical trajectories and local variations of militarism.  
In terms of the future study of militarism, it is important to continue to diversify how we 
look at militarism.  We think typological analysis is helpful, but what is even more helpful is 
a devotion to the historical sociological examination of militarism, especially looking at it 
through a global lens rather than a statist one. This entails sustained attention to the 
interaction between the social forces and social relations of militarism in the context of 
multiple political fields and histories and the ways they function not in isolation, but in 
coordination and co-constitution with larger dynamics of power in the world.  CSS has an 
opportunity to make a major advance in contemporary scholarship by examining the 
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